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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\~ADA WELL~IAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
\r. GLEN NOBLE and PERRY C. ADAMS,

Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATE1fENT OF FACTS
Appellants and Defendants in th!eir staten1ent of
facts dra \V only from those portions of the trial transcript that present the case in the light most favorable
to the appellants. In doing so appellants disregard
the Utah rule to the effect that on appeal the Supreme
Court in surveying the evidence will revie\\'" the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in
the trial court. Hillyard vs. r:tah By-Products CoJnpany, 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P2 287.
On July 3, 1956, Plaintiff and her two children \vere
riding as passengers in a Cadillac then being driven in a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

westerly direction by her brother-in-la\Y, Harold House,
on U. S. I-Iighway 30 in Duel County, X ebraska. llnrnediately ahead of the Cadillac ~Ir~. House \Yns driYing
a Studebaker in which Plaintiff's brother \\Tas riding
(T-4). The parties \Yere returning frorn Norfolk. Xebraska to their horne in Vancouver, \Vashington. That
about 4:00 P.I\I the area through \vhich they \\Tere travelling was grain country with rolling hills cr-4). ~Ir.
House testified that as he drove over the crest of one
of the rolling hills, he noticed that a pick-up truck to\\Ting a house-trailer was slowing do\vn, and it avpeared
that the truck \\Tas stalling (T-6). The pick-up and
house-trailer were driven to the shoulder of the road
so that the rear of the house-trailer extended about
three feet into the west-bound lane of the high\vay ( T -6)
(T-298). The Studebaker slo\ved down behind the housetrailer while it was being pulled onto the shoulder of
the road "'\vhere it came to a stop on th·e up-grade of the
next hill. The Studebaker then passed the house-trailer
and pick-up (T-298) (T-6). ~Ir. House, follo\ving in
the Cadillac, applied his brakes to slo\Y down, and \vhen
he observed the Defendant's truck behind hirn he put
his hand out as a signal to slow, for he \vas then unable
to pass the house-trailer due to a car approaching frorn
the opposite direction (~r-6) (T-~1) (T-2:2). As soon
as the oncoming traffic cleared he started to pass the
house-trailer and pick-up. As he \vas in the act of
passing these vehicles, his autornobile \Yas struck in the
rear by a large cab-over-engine truck and trailer unit
owned by Defendant, V. Glen Xoble, and driven by
Defendant Perry C. Adan1s (T-6). The collision occurred at a point npproxirnately 500 to 600 feet \ve~t
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of the hillcrest fro1n which the vehicles had just descended, and the point of in1pact was on the up-grade of
the next hill ( T -8). The truck unit struck the Cadillac
'vith a heavy i1npact knocking it ahead 15 to 20 feet
('r-117) (T-24). The truck had been following the two
autoutobiles at a distance of about 200 feet for about
fiYe utilL's, and the vehicles were all proceeding at a
speeJ in the vicinity of 45 to 50 miles per hour (T-172),
(T-190). ~lr. House testified that immediately following the collision he got out of his automobile and walked
back to the truck and had the following conversation
with the Defendant, Perry C. Adams :
~'Q.

All right. You may proceed. and then
what took place when the driver of the truck got
out1 Did you have a conversation with him?
A. Yes I did.

Q. Was anyone else present at the beginning
of that conversation~
A. Not at the present, at that conversation,
no.

Q. Will you relate, please, ~Ir. House, what
was said by you and what was said by :\Ir. Adarns
at that time~
A. I started walking back to the truck and
he got out of it, and I asked him if he had seen
me, and he said, 'Yes, I seen you'. And I said,
'Why didn't you slow your truck down?' And he
said, 'I don't know why I didn't.'
Q. Was there any further conversation had
between you at that time~
A. I don't think there \vas right at that particular time." ( T -9, 10)
3
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Plaintiff was taken to Chappell, Nebraska, where
she was hospitalized. Her attending physician had
X-rays taken of her neck and treated her \Yith various
medications. A cast type bandage (T-111) \Yas applied
to her neck to immobilize her neck in order for her to
be able to resume her trip to Vancouver, \V-ashington,
the following day (T-112). ~Irs. \vTelln1an traveled fron1
Chappell, Nebraska, to Vancouver lying on the hack seat
of the automobile.
Upon her arrival at Vancouver, she vvas hospitalized
and remained in the hospital for 8 days, \Yhere she \\·as
treated by a Dr. Reubendale (T-114). Follo,ving her
release from the hospital she \vas confined to bed at
home for a week. At the end of this ti1ne her husband
felt she was not making satisfactory progress tovvard
recovery and placed her under the care of Dr. J. C.
Woodward, an orthopedic surgeon (T-115). Dr. \-Voodward made a careful examination of her condition and
ordered her to be hospitalized at the Vancouver :Jiemorial Hospital (T-116). At the hospital she \vas placed
in traction and given rnedication for nausea and pain.
The nausea was so severe that it \vas necessary to feed
her intravenously ( T -117) for the first ten days of her
hospitalization. During the period that she re1nained
in the hospital, she was giYen various types of therapy
and conservative treat1nent (rr-117). ~Irs. Welhnan
was confined in the hospital fron1 July 23rd until August
11th, 1956. After she \Vas released frorn the hospital
she \vas given extensive physical therapy treat1nents
under the direction of Dr. \-rood\vard (T-57). When it
became apparent to her physician that the physical therapy treabnents \vere not achieving the desired results,
4
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he changed to another for1n of treat1nent, the injection
of a novoeain solution into the various tender areas at
the hasP of the 8kull ( T -58, 59). The purpose of these
injections \vas to break up the cycle and pain of the
u1usclP spasn1 fron1 which the plaintiff \Yas suffering.
Thi8 latter eoursP of treat1nent did not seem to accomplish an~· substantial ilnprovement in the plaintiff's condition (T-59).
In ~I arch of 1958, ~Irs. Wellman returned to Dr~
\Vood\vard, and at that time it appeared to him that
her condition had deteriorated and was about as bad
a~ it had been about 20 months earlier. During the preceding period of 20 Inonths she had been hospitalized,
and she had undergone extensive physical therapy treatInents in an effort by her physician to exhaust the
various forn1s of treatment short of surgery (T-59, 60).
In lVIarch of 1958, Dr. Woodward came to the conclusion that surgery was indicated, and at this time she
underwent two separate surgical procedures which consisted of the severing of Inuscles in the neck for the
purpose of relieving co1npression on the nerves and
artery. ~Irs. \\T ellman was hospitaliz'ed for a period
of from 10 days to 14: days for these surgical operation~
and recovery period. Follo\Ying the surgery, the plaintiff's condition showed definite signs of improvement
for some time (T-61, 6:2, 63), but a few months after
these operations she again began to have pains in her
neck and shoulders. Her condition \Va8 such that it
was necessary for her husband and their 12-year old
daughter to do a substantial portion of the housework
(T-163). Dr. Woodward examined the Plaintiff in
5
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1\Iarch of 1960, and at that tiine he found that the use
of her arn1s caused cramps in both sides of the neck
and the shoulders; that she suffered fron1 occipital headaches; and that there was atrophy of her n1uscles, or a
wastingaway of the muscle tissue. The Doctor stated
that in his opinion the atrophy was due to irritation of
the nerve roots \Vhere the nerves caine out of the openings between the vertebrae. ( T -63).
In regard to the plaintiff'8 pern1anent disability~
Dr. Woodward testified as follo,vs in response to counsel's questions:

"Q. N o\v, Doctor, based upon the nun1erous
examinations which you 1nade of _Jlrs. \Velhnan
- - the surgical procedures that you have performed and the history that you have taken fron1
her -- do you have an opinion as to \vhether or
not Mrs. Wellman suffers a permanent disability?
A. Yes, I have.

Q. And what is that opinion,

Doctor~

A. In my opinion l\lrs. W elhnan has suffered
a permanent disability amounting to approximately 20 per cent as a result of this injury."
(T-69).
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COl'RT GRANTING TO THE PLAINTIFF A NE\V TRlA.L ON THE
ISSUE (>F D..:\~LA.GES ALOXE, IX THE E\'"E~T
THE DEFENDANrr-, F .AILED TO t i<JNSENT TO AN
ADDITUR OF $3,000.00, \\TAS .A_ PROPER EXER6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cl~l~~ < >F

()F

'rH~

.TlTDICIAL DISC~RETION C>N THE PART
1,Rl1\L COURT.
POINT II.

r:rHE '"rRIAL ( (>URT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
'rlii~~ ~~~\~IDENCJ~, BEFORE IT DID NOT JUSTIFY
'ri-ll~ GI,"IXU OF AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
INS 'rRl ~ l ~ T I 0 N.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING TO THE PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL ON THE
ISSlTE OF DA:\li\_(JE,S ALONE, IN THE EVENT
THE DEFENDANT F i\ILED TO CONSENT TO AN
ADDITUR OF $3,000.00, WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION ON THE PART
OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Defendants contend, as the primary basis of their
appeal, that the trial judge abused his discretion when
he entered his Order providing for eii:her an additur
to the judgment with the consent of both parties, or for
a new trial on the issue of damages alone.
The Defendants' failure to consent to the additur
option offered hy the Court has made the question of
additur moot as to this appeal, and, therefore, th'e only
question before the appellate court is \Yhether or not
the trial court abused its discretion in granting to plaintiff a new trial on the issue of damages only.
The power of a trial court to grant a ne\v trial on
the ground of excessive or inadequate damages is clearly
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established in the provisions of R ulc 59 (a) ( 5) U.R.C.P.,
which provides:
"' (a) Grounds. Subject to the proYisions of
Rule 61, a new trial 1nay be granted to all or any
of the parties and on all or part of the issues,
for any of the following causes; * * *
( 5) Excessive or inadequate da1nages, a ppearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice."
In the case of Paul F. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261
P2 670, the Supre1ne Court of the State of utah carefully spelled out the rule in regard to verdicts where
the trial court had detern1ined that the jury had disregarded the instructions of the court, or where the verdict had been influenced by pa8~ion or prejudice. The
court states as follows at page 671 of the opinion:
''If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict
presents a situation that such inadequacy or excssiveness shows a disregard by the jury of the
evidence or the instructions of the court that the
verdict wa~ rendered under such disregard or
misapprehension of the evidence or influence of
passion or prejudice, then the court nzay e.rercise
its discretiou in t h c interest of justice and grant
a new tr£al." ( E1nphasi~ ours)
After hearing the argu1nenb.; of counsel, and after
examining the "\Yritten 1nen1orandu1ns submitted, the trial
court entered the follo"\\·ing order:
"This 1natter ca1ne before the Court on the
plaintiff's 1notion for ne'v trial and court having
heretofore taken the 1notion under advisement
8
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at thi~ ti1ne the court being fully advised in the
p rPnti ~es ntakes it's ruling.
In thi~ matter it appears to the Court that
the jury disregarded the Court's instruction pertaining to damages and that the a\vard was inadequate in view of all the evidence on that issue.
It further appears that the verdict was given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
It is ordered that the sum of $3,000.00 be
added to the verdict and if the plaintiff and the
defendants fail to consent to the additur within
30 days, a new trial is ordered on the issue of
damages only."
'_rhe Order of the trial judge made the following
specific findings :
a. That the jury disregarded the court's instructions
pertaining to damages :
b. That the aw·ard was inadequate 1n v1ew of all
of the evidence on that issue.
c. That it appeared that the verdict was given under
the influence of passion and prejudice.
Point I of Defendant's brief charges that in making
the foregoing Order the trial court was guilty of an
abuse of discretion. The power of the trial court to
exercise its discretion, and the basis upon which such
an exercise of discretion shall be reviewed has been discussed in many recent decisions of this Court. The leading case of recent years on the subject is King 1: [] nion
Pacific, 117 Ut. 40, 212 P2 692, 697, where the Court
~tated:
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"The defendant urgt~s that if a trial judge
is allowed to set aside a verdict returned hy a
jury which is supported by substantial competent
evidence, there results an infringement upon its
rights to a trial by jury. There is no rnerit in
this contention. The Supre1ne l ~ourt of the
United States in Capital Traction Co. D. Iiof,
174 U.S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 580, 585, 43 L. Ed. 873, a1nply
answered this argument when it said:
'Trial by jury, in the pri1nary and usual
sense of the term at the common la\v and in the
American constitutions, is not 1nerely a trial hy
a jury of 12 men before an officer vested \vith
authority to cause them to be sum1noned and ilnpaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the
constable in charge, and to enter judg1nent and
issue execution on their verdict; but it is a trial
by a jury of 12 n1en in the presence and under
the superintendence of a judge ernpou·ered to iustruct them on the law and to advise them on tlze
facts) and (except on acquittal of a criminal
charge) to set aside their verdict) if) in his opinion) it is against the la1D or the evidence.'"
(Emphasis ours)
An examination of the evidence before the trial
court clearly sho·w·s that the trial court \Yas justified in
finding that the jury disregarded the court's instructions in regard to damages and acted under passion and
prejudice in a\varding an inadequate verdict.
It is clear from the evidence that on July 3, 1956,
plaintiff sustained an injury to her cervical spine at the
ti1ne the auton1obile in \Yhich she \Yas riding \Yas struck
hy defendant's truck \vhich had a loaded weight of 33
tons (T-183 ). The evidence is further indisputable that
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plaintiff \va:--; hospitalized immediately after the accident;
that hPr nPck \va:--; im1nobilized by placing it in a type of
a cast; and that :--;he was given 1nedications in an effort
to relieve her frorn the severe pain and nausea that
follo\ved her initial injury. Plaintiff was forced to ride
lying do,vn in the back seat of an automobile from
Nehra~~ka to Vancouver, Washington, and during this
long journe~: she suffered great pain and frequent spells
of nausea ( T -112).
lininediately upon her arrival in Vancouver, Washington, l\Irs. Wellman was ordered to be hospitalized
for a period of eight days (T-113). Upon being released
fro1n the hospital she returned to her home where she
\Vas confined to her bed for a period of ten days. Her
husband observed that in the days following her release
from the hospital that instead of recovering, her condition \vas becoming more serious each day; she became so
nauseated that she was unable to eat food or take any
liquids \vithout vomiting (T-157). 1\Ir. Wellman's concern over his \vife's deteriorating condition during this
ten day period caused him to seek additional medical
care for his \vife (T-158). He took his \vife to Dr. J. C.
Woodward, an orthopedic surgeon, a diplomat of the
A1nerican Board of Orthopedic Surgery, and a fellow
of the Alnerican College of Surgeons ( T -158, 40).
Dr. Wood\vard's X-Rays and initial examination of
plaintiff indicated that sh'e needed immediate hospitalization, and he sent her to the Vancouver 1\Iemorial
Hospital. Upon her arrival at the hospital she was put
in traction, and because of her severe nausea it was
necessary to feed her by intravenous feedings for ten
days (T-116).
11
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After 1\Irs. Wellman's release fro1n this second
period of hospitalization she was required to \vear a
plastic cervical collar; to sleep with a traction device
upon her neck; and to take daily diathermy treat1nents
(T-120). Plaintiff continued these treatments over an
extended period of time in an effort to find relief fron1
the pain in her neck and shoulders and the headaches
from which she was suffering (T-120, 121).
In N ove1nber of 1957, 11r. Wellman \Yas transferred
from Vancouver, Washington, to th'e Seattle, Washington,
branch of his ernployer's business. After their arrival
in the Seattle area, plaintiff's condition began to get
worse. Her hands and arn1s beca1ne numb, and she 'vas
not able to hold things she picked up (T-121). Her condition was such that it was difficult for her to do her
housework, and she required help from other persons
to perform her daily household duties ( T -121).
By lVIarch of 1958, it became apparent to Mrs. Wellman that the deterioration of her condition, the increasing pain and suffering, and the progressive loss of bodily
function required further medical attention. She returned to Vancouver to see Dr. Woodward, and he determined at that tin1e that the course of conservative
treatment that had been followed in the period subsequent to her injury \vas not providing relief for her,
and that surgical intervention \vould be necessary. Therefore, two separate surgical procedures were performed,
each under a general anesthetic; each procedure consisted of dividing a muscle in the neck close to the point
where it fastens to the first rib and allowing the n1uscle
to retract upward. The purpose of this surgery \Vas to

12
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rPlil'Ye the ('Olnpression of the muscle upon the artery
and nerves ( T -61). These were painful operations, and
it \\~as neePssary that plaintiff be placed in a cast followiug the surgery (T-130). This surgery was performed
ahnost t\\·o years after the original injury and following
a grt>at effort on plaintiff's part to obtain relief from
hl'l' pain, suffering, and disability.

F.,ollo\ving the surgery, ~Irs. Wellman obtained a
certain a1nount of reli'ef, but before long she again began to suffer pains in the shoulders, ar1ns, and neck
and to ~uffer fron1 occipital headaches, as she had so
frequently since sustaining her injuries (T-131, 132).
rl"he evidence indicates that she was able to perform
onl~r a portion of her household duties. That her husband and her 12 year old daughter had been required
to do a 1najor portion of the household work. That her
activities were restricted so that she could not enjoy
e~unping and dancing as she had previously done. Her
husband testified that subsequent to her injury a substantial change had taken place in her temperment and
disposition. 'l"hat prior to her injury she was not a
person \Yho co1nplain'ed, but that after the injury she
was irritable and upset with her husband and children
(T-164). Dr. Wood\vard testified that based upon the
treatment and examination of the plaintiff during a
period in excess of four years, that he evaluated her
disability rating as one of approximatley 20% permanent disability (T-69).
In the light of the medical evidence, of \vhich the
foregoing is but a brief summation, and in view of the
fact that the trial judge had the opportunity to observe
13
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the witnesses, both lay and uredieal, it is apparent that
he did not abuse his discretion \vhen he found as a fact
that the jury had disregarded his instructions pertaining
to damages, in that an award of ~;2,000.00 general danlages was so inadequate as to appear to the court to
have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
Appellate courts have not been un1nindful of the
particularly advantageous position of the trial judge
in regard to evaluating the evidence presented r.t the
trial. Th Suprerne Court of the State of New Jersey
discussed this sub,~ect in the case of Ruth v. Fenchel,
117 A2 284, \vhere they stated as follo\vs at page 289 of
the opinion:
"We are aware of the responsibility lodged
in a jury to resolve the factual conflict \vhich is
invariably present in a negligence case. However;
we are also sensitive to the emphasis placed by
our Supreme Court in Hartpence v. Grouleff. 15
N.J. 545, 549, 105 A 2d ( 1954), upon the superior
position enjoyed by the trial judge over that of
the appellate court in deciding ''vhether justire
has been done under the particular circumstancef:
and the weight of the credible evidence,' and this
because 'H·e sees and hears the \vitnesses, observes
their demeanor and reactions, none of \Yhich has
life in the record on appeal. He is in a position
to kno\v and equate all the factors * * *.' We
are enjoined not to disturb th'e action of the trial
court, 'unless it clearly and unequivocally appears
there was a manifest denial of justice under the
law.' The Appellate Division 1nay not substitute
its judgment for that of the trial judge merely
because it evaluates the evidence in a light that
14
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would justify the jury verdict. Gallichio v. Gumina, 35 N.J. Super. 442, 446-447, 114 A 2d 447
(App. Div. 1955 )."
rrhe inadequacy of the jury's award to the plaintiff
and the disregard of the Court's instructions by th~e
jury LPeoJne particularly apparent from the fact that
the undisputed n1edical expenses incurred by the Plaintiff in the treatinent of these injuri~es amounted to
$2,539.50. The expenses that she incurred for household
help ainounted to $252.00. The disregard of the court's
instruction No. 10 is further apparent by the fact that
the jur~T failed to award plaintiff any damages as a
result of her loss of earnings, although the evidence
'vas clear and undisputed that at the time that she sustained the injury, she was earning the sum of $10.00
each \veek and \vould have been able to continue to earn
such su1u from the time of her return to Vancouver.
Washington, on July 6, 1956, up to the time that she and
her husband and fanlily Inoved to Kent, vVashington,
in November of 1957. Her earnings during this period
\Vould have amounted to $680.00 (T-125, 127). The
evidence is clear and without dispute that the total
amount of the special damages suffered by plaintiff
as a result of her injuries was the sum of $3,471.50, but
despite this uncontroverted evidence of such damages,
the jury award to plaintiff for all special damages was
the total sum of $2,500.00.
It is submitted that the arbitrary failure of the
jury to award Plaintiff the total of her medical expenses,
the expenses incurred for hous'ehold help, and the sums
that she would have earned during this period is substantial evidence of passion and prejudice against the
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plaintiff on the part of the jury, and it is further
evidence of the failure on the part of the jury to fairly
and justly consider her clain1 in the light of the court's
instructions. Dr. Woodward testified that Plaintiff \Ya~
a cooperative patient, and that she follo\ved his instructions carefully in an effort to improve her O\\Tn condition (T-99). The medical witness appearing on behalf
of the defense indicated that in his opinion the plaintiff
was not a n1alinger nor a neurotic ( T -273).
The Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah discussed
the responsibility of a trial judge in regard to his duty
to pass on the adequacy of a jury verdict in the case of
Badon vs. Suhrn~ann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P2 826, wehre
the Court stated at page 830:

''* * * It is primarily the prerogative and
the duty of the trial court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and to order any necessary
modification thereof."
In this case the Supren1e C1ourt recognized the long
established practice of courts to exercise supervisory
powers over the verdict \vhere the da1nages awarded
were in excess of those shown by the evidence. The
Court stated at page 828:
"It has long been established that where the
award is in excess of da1nages shown by the
evidence it \vill not be per1nitted to stand. In
such instances the courts exercise their inherent
supervisory povvers over jury verdicts, which
derive fran~ their duty to see that justice is done;
and nu1ke correctire orders necessary for that
purpose. This is done hy the trial court, or upon
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its failure to do so, by this court on appeal."
( Emphasi~ ours.)
It i~ sub1nitted that under the powers granted the
trial ('ourt to order a new trial on all or part of the
i~~ues un<lPr our rules of eivil procedure, that the duty
of the trial eourt in respect to taking action in regard
to an ina<lPquate award of damages stands on the same
sound legal basis as the trial court's power to act in
regard to a situation involving an excessive award of
damages.
In the caS'e of Seydel v. Reuber, 94 NW2 265, the
Supren1e Court of the State of Minnesota at page 270,
recognized the rule adopted by the Utah Supreme ( ourt
in the Badon v. Suhrmann case, supra, in the following
language:
1

HWe have fully taken into account, while considering the record in this case, that the granting
or refusal of a new trial upon the ground of inadequacy of damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice
is largely within the discretion of the trial court
and that the ruling of the trial court will not be
disturbed on appeal unless there was a clear abuse
of discretion."
The rule in regard to the manner in which an app'ellate court should examine the relevant evidence in determining "'"hether there was substantial probative evidence
to justify the ruling of the trial court is stated in the
follo,ving language by the Supreine Court of the State
of ~Iissouri in the case of Underwood v. Brocknu:yer,
318 SW2 192, at page 194:
''In determining whether there was substan-
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tial probative evidence to justi f~T the trial eourt,
upon weighing all the evidence, to reasonaLly <onelude that the $1,250.00 a\Yarded as dainages \':ns
grossly inadequate, we consider tlz e relevant C1 idence from a standpoint favoralJ!e to tlze trial
court's ruling, u·hich in this iu.stunce, nzeau.-.,· that
we consider the evidence franz a stand point f(u·orable to plaintiff." (Emphasis ours).
1

Considering the evidence of Plaintiff's injury, pain
and suffering, disability, and special da1nages fron1 a
standpoint favorabl'e to the trial court's ruling, there is
no reasonable basis to support defendant's contention
that the order of the trial court on the n1otion for a ne\Y
trial consititued an abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge
POINT II.
THE rrRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT DID KOT JUSTIFY
THE GIVING OF AN" lTNA\TOIDABLE ACCIDEXT
INSTRUCTION.
The defendants In their Point II. apparently are
of the belief that because they plead the defense of
unavoidable accident in the Answer, and because at the
pre-trial they relied upon this saine defense, that they
are thus entitled to have tbe jury instructed on the question of unavoidable accident, regardless of the state of
the evidence before the trial court at tbe ti1ne the instructions to the jury \Yere frained.
r~rhe

only evidence before the appellate court that
when the defendant driver reached the ere8t of thP
crucial hill that thP neare8t Yehicle ''Tas 100 feet distant
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is the stat<'tnent to that effect contained on pages J and
:2:2 of defendants' brief. D0fendant Adams' testimony
in regard to the distancP \Vas as follows:
(By 1\lr. 1\Iidgley)
~'Q. How Inuch distaneP separated your truck

froin the rear of the Cadillac at that tiine when
you first obsert:ed them stopped or slowly Inoving~ (Emphasis ours) (T-174)
A. About a hundred feet I would judge."
It is subn1itted that the fact that defendant Adams
was about a hundred feet from the automobile in which
plaintiff was riding \vhen he observed the Cadillac is a
very different fact and presents a very different legal
situation than the statement in appellant's brief on page
22 to the effect "that when he reached the crest of the
crucial hill the nearest vehicle was only 100 feet distant".
The trial judge in considering the applicability of
the unavoidable accident instruction was certainly entitled to consider the further testiinony of the defendant
Adams as to \vhy he did not see the Cadillac, the Studebaker, and the house trailer \vhen his truck \vas at the
crest of the "crucial hill". On cross examination defendant Adam~ testified as follo\vs:

''Q. Have you any explanation as to \vhy you
didn't see these automobiles and this house trailer
at the point I have indicated, or, perhaps, at
very best \vhen your truck \vas at the point I
have marked \vith X, rather than at the point
you have dra\vn on the dra\ving?
A. Well, a man is al\vays driving ahead of
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himself, looking ahead at the traffic. And I con1e
over the hill like I say, there was no indira tj ons
whatsoever they were ~topped. I didn't reali.ze
they were stopped. And as I caine over the hill
I glanced on up the hill and back do,vn at them,
and ahout that time I realized they \VPre stopped.''
{T-194-195) (Emphasis ours)
The foregoing testimony of the defendant certainly
justifies a finding on the part of the trial judge that the
evidence did not support an unaYoidable accident instruction. This finding is further supported hy the testiInony of the relief driver of the truck to the effect that
the distance froin the bottom of the s"\\~ail to the easterly
hill crest was 150 to 175 feet ( T -233). l\Ir. House testified that the collision occurred not at the bottom of the
swail but beyond the bottom of the swail on the \Vesterly
upgrade of the next hill ( T -8). This testimony is not
disputed by either Adams or the relief driver, Whitley.
The only conclusion that can be dra\vn fro1n the testimony is that the defendant Adams had a distance in
excess of 150 to 175 feet past the crest of the '"crucial
hill" in which to stop. Plaintiff's 'vitness places the
distance from the crest of the hill to the point \vhere the
house trailer was parked at from 500 to 600 feet (T-7).
It is clear fron1 all of the evidence that \vhile the
distance at \vhich defendant Ada1ns clai1ns he first
realized the Cadillac slo,ving \Vas 100 feet; the distance
at U'hich he sau, or could ha~·e ._...,·een that the Cadillac
was slozriug and should have taken action to ::;top his
truck was substantially greater than 100 feet.
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dent has occupied the attention of many appellate courts
in recent eases. In the case of B11tigan 1:. Yellow Cab
Conl})(lJl_tf, (('1alifornia) ~t~O 1~. ~d 500, at page 504, the
Suprerne C~ourt of California comments on the question
of instructing tlu~ jury on unavoidable accidents as
follO\V~:

·~In

the modern negligence action the plaintiff
111ust prove that the injury complained of was
proximately cau~ed by the defendant's negligence,
and the defendant under a general denial may
show any circumstances which militates against
his negligence or its causal effect. The so-called
defense of inevitable accident is nothing more
than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or
a contention that his negligence, if any, was not
the proximate cause of the injury. Scott v. Burke,
39 Cal. 2d 388, 401, 247 P. 2d 313; Polk t~. City
of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 2d 519, 542-543, 159 P. 2d
931; see also Jolley v. Clemens, 28 Cal. Apv. 2d
55, 65, 82 P. 2d 51. The staternent in the quoted
instruction on "unavoidabl'e or inevitable accident' that these terms 'sirnply denote an accident
that occurred without having been proximately
caused by negligence' inforn1s the jury that the
question of unavoidability or inevitability of an
accident arises only where the plaintiff fails to
sustain his burden of proving that the defendant's negligence caused the accident. Since the
ordinary instructions on negligence and proximate cause sufficiently show that the plaintiff
must sustain his burden of proof on these issues
in order to recover, the instruction on una~·oidable
accident serves no useful purpose.
It is particularly significant that no decision
in this state, either prior or subsequent to Parker
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v. Womack, 37 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P. 2d 823, has
held that refusal to give the instrllcfion 1ras ·reversible error. In sereral cases in zrhich error
had been claimed because of such a rc.f llsal, it
was held that the instruction u·as .-,·uperfluous."
(Emphasis ours)
In the 11ontana case of Rodoni c. Hoskins, 355 P2
296, cited in defendants' brief, the court reversed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the unavoidable accident instruction was erroneously given. In discussing the evidence the Court said at page 299:
"In the instant case, it appears fro1n all of
the testimony that an instruction concerning unavoidable accident \vas not appropriate. There
was no testimony of negligence on the part of
the driver of the Erickson vehicle, in which the
plaintiff was a passenger. However, there \vas
ample testimony from which negligence could be
inferred on the part of the defendant. The defendant himself testified that he \Vas familiar
with the road and knew of the approxi1nate location of the chuck hole and that it could 'throw
my car if I hit it'. He knew· the streets \\~ere in
a slippery and dangerous condition. He also
testified that he saw the lights of the Erickson
vehicle before going into the curve. However,
the defendant, fron1 the testimony, apparently did
not slow his vehicle or let the Erickson vehicle
pass before crossing the chuck hole. [T nder t lz ese
circunzstances 1re conclude that there u·ere no
facts present concerning una1:oidable accident to
.iustify the instruction and the giving of such an
instruction b11 the trial court U'as reversible error
as to the }Jlaintiff." (Emphasis ours)
A rnost con1presensive analysis of the unavoidable
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accident instruetion is found in the 1959, Kansas case of
Krch r. 1,riuklc, ~)-t3 P2 213, \vhere at page 223 the
Court said:
Hln an ordinary negligence action the plaintiff must prove that the injury con1plained of
\vas proxi1nately caused by the defendant's negligence, and the defendant under a general denial
nu1~~ ~hO\\. any circumstances \vhich tend to militate against his negligence or, if negligent, its
casual effect. The 1nere fact that the defendant
pleads in his answer the defense of unavoidable
accident does not entitle hirn to an instruction
on the doctrine of unavoidable accident.
If the so-called defense of unavoidable accident is nothing more than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or a contention that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the
injury, the pleading on this point is irnmaterial,
since an instruction to the jury under these circumstances would inform the jury that the question of unavoidability or inevitability of an accident arises only where the plaintiff fails to sustain his burden of proving that the defendant's
negligence caused the accident. The instruction
under these circumstances "\vould serve no useful
purpose, since the ordinary instructions on negligence and proximate cause sufficiently show that
the plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof on
the issues of negligence in order to recover."
VVhere the evidence before the jury is confined to the issues of negligence, an instruction
which informs the jury that the la\v recognizes
what is terrned an 'unavoidable or inevitable
accident' may give the jury the irnpression that
unavoidability is an issue to be decided, and that
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if proved, it constitutes a separate ground of nonliability of the defendant. r-rhey 1nay then be Ini~
led as to the proper 1nanner of determining
liability, that is, solely on thP basis of negligence
and proximate causation. The instruction under
these circumstances is not only unnecessary, but
it is confusing.
It would therefore appear to be the better
practice, where the evidence is confined to issue~
of negligence, for the trial court to eliminate any
reference to 'lT navoidable accident' in summarizing the pleadings of the defendant for the jury
in its instructions since the defendant's pleadings
on 'unavoidable accident' have becon1e iininaterial."
There was no contention that the plaintiff \Yas
negligent in any manner in the case now before the court.
There was not even any contention that the driver
of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was
negligent. The instructions of the court fairly and fully
presented the issues of negligence to the jury, and stated
that the burden \Vas upon the plaintiff to prove the
negligence of the defendant before he \\~as entitled to
recover.
The Utah Suprerne Court has recently commented
on the necessity of giving an unavoidable accident instruction in the case of Porter r. Pr£ce, 11 Utah 2d 80,
355 P2 66, at page 68 :
Hit is true that In 1nost cases the usual instruction on negligence and proxin1ate cause
make it sufficiently clear that the plaintiff n1ust
sustain his burden of proof on these issues in
order to recover, and that in such instances an
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insfr~tcfion

on IUULroidahle accident serces no
Nscful zntr}Jose." (Emphasis ours)

There is no eontention by the defendants that there
\vas an~? error or inadequacy in the manner in which the
trial court instructed the jury in regard to negligence
and proxi1nate cause, and that the plaintiff must sustain
his burden of proof on these issues in order to recover.
Based on the evidence hefore the trial court and the
instructions that were given to the jury on the foregoing
1natters, it is evident that the trial court properly deterlnined that an instruction on unavoidable accident
could serve no useful purpose.
CONCLUSION
The Order of the trial court granting plaintiff a
ne'v trial on the grounds that the jury disregarded the
court's instructions pertaining to damages, and that an
inadequate a'vard was given under the influence of
passion or prejudice was amply supported by the la'v
and the evidence. Appellate courts have constantly held
that trial courts have broad discretion in such matters,
and that their discretion "Till not be disturbed in the
absence of a plain abuse thereof. No such abuse of
discretion has been shown by the defendants.
We respectfully submit that the Order of the trial
court should be affirmed.
DAVID K. HOLTHER,
and
DAVID S. KlTNZ
for Kunz & Kunz
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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